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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
COMPENSATORY JURISPRUDENCE IN INDIA AND
U.S.A.: JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITIQUE
Sushila Rao*

This paper examines the position regardingConstitutionalTorts and
payment of compensationfor the violation of Constitutional Rights
in the U.S.A., in order to provide a comparativeframework for
contextualising the introduction of the same in India. Further, the
paper outlines the policy rationalesfor waiving governmental
immunity, examines the different approaches to governmental
liability in the U.S.A., and traces the genesis and fruition of an
analogous device in India under Article 32 of the Constitutionfor
redressing victims of State excesses, by examining judicial
pronouncements on the same. Finally, it highlights certainpersistent
doubts raised on a scrutiny of the judicial evolution of compensatory
jurisprudencein the area of Constitutionalinfractions by the State,
outlines the inconsistencies in judicial thought, and seeks to provide
guidelines to remedy such inconsistencies.

.........................................................

94

II.

THE RATIONALE BEHIND ESTABUSHING GOVERNMENT LIABILITY ............

96

III.

CoNTEXTUAzNG CONSTriTuONAL TORTS

98

IV.

TRACING THE EvOLUTION oF WRrr COMPENSATION IN INDIA .................

100

A.

THE PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ..........................

100

B.

JUDICIAL

101

.

*

INTRODUCTION

TRENDS .

IN THE UNITED STATES ..........

.......................

...................

(i)

The Diffident Initial Pronouncements

(ii)

Breakthrough Decisions: Ambivalent Justifications .........

(iii)

Further Developments

(iv)

Custodial Deaths and Torture: Ambivalence Eschewed ... 104

(v)

Fencing the Power

.................

.............. 101
102

........ 104

............................

II Year, B.A. LL.B (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.

93

o6

Vol. 18(1)

Student Bar Review

2oo6

V.

WELL BEGUN, BUT HALF-DONE: PROTRACTED INCONSISTENCIES IN WRIT
COMPENSATION JURISPRUDENCE
...................................
107

VI.

CONCLUSION

.............................................

......

110

1. INTRODUCTION
If the plaintiff has a right, "he must of necessity have a means to vindicate

and maintain it; and indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy;
for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocaL"'
The world over, a welfare state has been eulogized, resulting in a
corresponding expansion of its powers and functions, and greater encroachment
into the domain of individual rights. Thus, the extent and scope of action against
the state for the imposition of state liability for rights violations is increasing.
Furthermore, it is an irrefutable principle of civil and criminal jurisprudence that
any individual who infringes the rights of another is to be punished, and monetary
compensation is to be granted in certain circumstances when the victim is
adversely affected by such infringement? Similarly, the State, which performs its
functions through its huge apparatus of employees, is also liable, with few
exceptions, to pay monetary compensation, whenever its employees contravene
rights,3 more so in any country governed by the rule of law and democracy. The
State is thus liable for its employees' misdemeanors in the area of their
administrative functions.
The concrete manifestation of this principle may be seen in the genesis of
the "Constitutional Tort" in various jurisdictions, in particular, the U.S.4 In the
American context, and as used in this paper, the term "Constitutional Tort"

Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (1703) (Holt, C.J.), cited from
DHIRAJLAL, LAW OF TORTS 20 (G.P. Singh ed., 2002).

4

RATANLAL

&

See generally M.S.V. Srinivas, Compensation underArticles 32 and 226 for Violation of
Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, A.I.R. 1997 (JouR.) 167.
Pecuniary compensation is a judicially recognised and endorsed mode of enforcing
fundamental rights by the courts, as also the right to compensation for victims of
unlawful arrest or detention. The two opinions rendered by Verma and Anand, JJ.
in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, AI.R. 1993 S.C. ig6o, are unanimous on the
aforesaid dicta. See also Srinivas, id. at 168.
For the genesis of this principle in the U.S., see generally Christina Whitman,
ConstitutionalTorts, (1980) 79 MicE. L REv. 5, 6 [hereinafter Whitman, Constitutional
Torts].
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encompasses all claims for damages brought against government officials for
violating an individual's federal constitutional rights.
Closer home, this approach is exemplified in the creation of the
extraordinary remedy of writ compensation by the Supreme Court, by putting its
wide powers under Article 32 to innovative and judicious use. This development
must be seen in the context of the excruciatingly slow, complicated, and often
unrewarding process, of pursuing a claim in tort in a civil court against the
government; and the conservative attitude of the Indian legal system with regard
to errors of omission, commission and callousness on the part of the State, "thus
breeding and fostering lack of accountability of the public servant."s
It is pertinent to note that in India, even a cursory survey of judicial
decisions conclusively establishes that the ambit of writ compensation has thus
far, largely been restricted to compensating victims whose guaranteed
fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution, have been infringed, as
opposed to the American position, wherein a violation of any constitutional right
can give rise to a valid claim for pecuniary redressal. This point is further
elaborated upon in this paper. The author further submits that this position must
be viewed in the context of the unique status accorded to the fundamental rights,
which were meant to play a pivotal role in the "social revolution" envisaged by
the Constitution-makers, and were meant to be a check on arbitrary state action."
Furthermore, the remedy of writ compensation is still on relatively new ground
in India, whereas the U.S. courts began awarding such a remedy as far as back as
in 1961.7 The rigours of British rule, which resulted in the complete subordination
of liberty and civil rights to the whims of the State, reinforced the compulsion to
ensure that these entrenched rights were capable of being enforced effectivelyA
Thus a special jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 329 was created,

6

T. PATEL, PERSONAL LIBERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 239 (1993).
For the scope for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under Article 32, see 7 LOK
SABHA SECRETARIAT, CONSTTUENT AssEMSBLY DEBATES 930-955 (rev. ed. 1999).
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

7Monroe

a

PATEL,

supra note 5, at 239.

9 CONsrrnrmoN or INDIA, Article 32:

32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part: - (i) The

right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or order or
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the

enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
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Vol. 18(1)

Student Bar Review

2006

which confers on it the status of "the custodian of the Constitutional Rights and
the protector thereof." What is crucial to note is that this right to approach the
Apex Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights is itself a fundamental right.
Given this background, the notion of "fundamental" rights would become
meaningless, unless the Constitution is interpreted as requiring some affirmative
remedy for their gross violation. If rights are violated, the violation cannot be
undone, and often the only practicable and effective mode to provide a palliative
for the victim's wounds is by way of awarding compensation. As will be elucidated
subsequently by the author, the conventional remedies are often found wanting
in several circumstances, and this virtually necessitates compensation.
Therefore, this paper seeks to contextualize this dynamic trend in judicial
thought in terms of efforts in other jurisdictions to grapple with similar issues,
most notably the U.S.A.; to examine its origin and fruition through judicial
creativity; and then to reflect on some glaring discrepancies that merit urgent
consideration.

11. THE

RATIONALE BEHIND ESTABLISHING GoVERNMENT
LIABILITY

Traditional tort law recognizes damages as a remedy that affirms rights,
provides compensation, promotes deterrence, vindicates the citizens' reliance

on the sacrosanct nature of their rights, and secures corrective justice." Imposing
government liability for constitutional violations attempts to advance analogous
goals, which include:
a. Affirming the plaintiffs rights: When an individual's constitutional rights
are violated, remedies, such as injunctions can only serve to restrict future
constitutional harm. Unless he is paid damages for the past loss he has suffered,
his constitutional rights would be meaningless. 2 Compensations paid for past
violations, as opposed to writs for habeas corpus, etc. (which can be availed of
only if the impugned violation is subsisting, and would be futile if awarded after
the violation has come to an end), serve to underline the sacred nature of the
rights concerned, and the stringent outlook of the judiciary towards any State
transgression of the same.
0

See D.K. Basu v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 61o.
W. P. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON oN ToRTS 20-26 (1984).
See generally C. Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, (1997)
72

Cu-KEr L. REv. 661.
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b. Deterrence of Constitutional violations and the avoidance of overdeterrence: Deterrence is of prime importance in the context of violations of
constitutional rights, because the impugned conduct is the very action that the
framers of the Constitution sought to avoid. Unlike an injunction or other remedies,
damages are a tangible result, which forces the government to transfer funds
from the public treasury to the private citizen. This in turn requires either higher
taxes or government cost-cutting. In the process, the government, if held
accountable through institutional liability, would then take the necessary steps
to reduce its liability by selecting more competent employees, by providing them
with better and more continuous training, by ensuring more supervision of its
employees, and by creating internal disciplinary rules for violators of the
Constitution. Simultaneously, as personal liability of the officers is removed,
government agents can perform their governmental duties zealously, knowing
that any unwitting/unavoidable constitutional infraction will be covered by their
employer and not by their paycheck.3
c. Breach of Social Contract: A Constitution is a social contract through
which individuals give up certain liberties, in exchange for government-provided
community services like enforcement of social norms through criminal law,
economic infrastructure, and social stability."4 However, the government also
agrees to certain limitations on its authority in the form of constitutional rights.
Whenever the government breaches this contract on which the people have relied
to their detriment, they deserve compensation.)6
d. Corrective Justice: The Aristotelian theory of "corrective justice"
requires the award of monetary compensation whenever one party ignores the
limitations placed upon its behavior with respect to another party. 7 In certain
cases, when the government oversteps its limitations, the plaintiff suffers loss
while the state may realize gains through more efficient policy implementation.
The transfer of funds from the wrongdoer to the victim restores the balance.8
e. Responsibility as Principal and Employer: Since the government selects
its own agents, trains them, and oversees their employment, the government
13

14
is

6

T.H. Jefferson, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law Principles, (1997) 50 VAND. L.
REV. 1525, 1553-55.
See generally C. W. Mous, THE SocuA CorrRACT THEoRsS (1999).
See J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 10-11 (1997).
Id.

J. C.Jeffries, Jr., Compensationfor Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance
of Fault, (1989) 88 Mica. L. REv. 82, 94-95.
8

Id.
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alone is in the best position to institute the programs necessary to eradicate
constitutional violations.' 9 Because most constitutional violations are attributable
to systemic flaws in the state, it is the state that should face liability in order to
facilitate correction of those flaws. By selecting the best employees, by providing
them with adequate and continued training, and by disciplining them for their
unconstitutional behavior, the government can substantially reduce the number
of constitutional torts.2 Further, it is inconsistent that the government may be
liable for the common law torts of its employees but not their constitutional
misconduct.In the U.S.A., it was also felt that the concept of a "Constitutional Tort"
implicitly recognizes that constitutional rights and liberties are specific limitations
on governments, and must be enforceable.Y Thus, it naturally follows that the
courts must allow the traditional common law remedy, that is, damage suits, not
because constitutional rights parallel the interests protected by common law tort
actions, but because constitutions are enforceable in their own right.

I1.

CONTEXTUALIZING CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS IN THE
UNITED STATES

The typical constitutional tort involves an individual who was injured
because of a government official's alleged wrongdoing, like an unreasonable
search, or custodial rape. It is, thus, hard to precisely determine the difference
between constitutional and common law torts.23 Essentially, constitutional tort
law marries the substantive rights granted by the Constitution to the remedial
mechanism of tort law.24 The difference between constitutional torts and a civil
action against the government is accentuated by the inapplicability of the common
law defence of "sovereign immunity" to constitutional tort. Fundamental rights

19
2

Jefferson, supra note 13, at 1558.
L. Oren, Immunity andAccountabilityin Civil Rights Litigation: Who ShouldPay?,(1989)
50 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 935, 1003.

2
2
23

See generally Jeffries, supra note 17.
Jeffries, supra note 17.
See generally S. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background"of Tort Liability, (1974)
50 InD. L.J. 5.
M. Wells, ConstitutionalRemedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, (1998) 68 Miss.
L.J. 157, 157.
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are designed to limit the reach of the state, while sovereign immunity would
effectively bar the vindication of those rights, when the state transgresses them.
The U.S. has a written Constitution guaranteeing a Bill of Rights, which
contains the Due Process of Law clause. The said clause confers wide powers on
the judiciary to provide complete justice, and to order monetary compensation
in appropriate cases. Traditionally, however, the Constitution has not been made
the basis for affirmative remedies. There has been a strong bias towards nullifying
the effect of constitutional violations, as in Mapp v. Ohio,2 6 wherein it was simply
held that evidence gained by the State in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment could not be used in the courts.
From the mid-twentieth century, courts expanded the range of remedies
available for constitutional violations. The constitutional tort action emerged
from two Supreme Court judgments, wherein the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the common law could not adequately regulate the government's unique
power to inflict injuries, and established a system where the Constitution, rather
than state common law systems, governs the actions of federal and state officials,
which cause injury to individuals.
In Monroe v. Pape,27 the Court held that section 1983' extends to a State

official's acts that exceed his authority, creating an avenue for individuals to
argue that the Constitution itself regulated State government officials' acts, and
the number of section 1983 cases brought to federal courts exploded, as they
were not restricted any more to only the State law. It was observed by some

25

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). See also R.C. Jn, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 26-46

26

(1995).
367 U.S. 943 (1961).

2

365 U.S. 167 (1961).

28

The sweeping language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (commonly known as § 1983) provides
that:
Every person who, under color of any [state law] subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any [constitutional rights]
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
The United States Congress enacted § i983, in 1871, in response to the widespread

violence against blacks in the South, and it is the foundation of most suits against
state and local government employees to remedy federal law violations.
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commentators that this appeared to be the beginning point of the evolution of the
concept of "Constitutional Tort."Y
In 1971, in the landmark case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

the FederalBureau of Narcotics,3o the American Supreme Court held that the
violation of the Fourth Amendment could be made the basis of a civil suit against
erring federal officers. This filled the remedial gap created after Monroe, for
individuals wishing to bring suits for the misconduct of federal officials.?' Harlan,
J., in a famous statement, said:
For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing.?2
Thus, the American Bill of Rights is a constitutional limitation, powerful
enough to be directly made the basis of an action for damages, without awaiting
legislative authorization. There is no reason why the same should not hold true
for fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution.

IV.

TRACING THE EvoLuTiON OF WRIT COMPENSATION IN
INDIA

A. The Pertinent Constitutional Framework
Article 32 of the Constitution provides for the enforcement of fundamental
rights by the Supreme Court. Enforcement literally connotes "compelling the

See, e.g., M.S. Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape, and the FrontiersBeyond,
(1965) 6o Nw. U. L. REV, 277, 324, cited from Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra

note 4, at 6.
30

Bivens, supra note 25, where six federal agents entered the appellant's residence at

night, arrested, manhandled and searched him, and repeated the same at their
headquarters. The Court felt that in the absence of effective alternative remedies,
the Fourth Amendment could directly be made the basis of an action for damages
without waiting for a legislative mandate. Thus, the Supreme Court sanctioned an
affirmative remedy based directly on the Constitution.
3 In India, on the other hand, given the unique position of the fundamental rights,
petitions seeking their enforcement are filed directly, in the form of writs in the
higher courts, instead of civil suits.
31 Bivens, supra note 25, at 410. In his judgement, Harlan, J., explained the propriety
of awarding damages for violation of a constitutionally protected interest. He stated
that if the court is competent to select remedies for statutory and common-law policies,
it is also competent to do the same for constitutional violations. Further, he asserted
the value of deterrence.
100
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observance of law."33 Thus, this appears to include not only the redressal of
particular violations, but also ensuring that rights are not violated with impunity
in the future. The Constitution has expressly placed this responsibility on the
Supreme Court, and the Court is the "sole arbiter"34 of the appropriateness of the
relief that may be granted.
Conventionally under Article 32, there was not much scope for the award
of positive, dynamic relief, even in cases where traditional methods of relief

through writs would be wholly inadequate in actualizing the objectives of Part
III.35 It is submitted, however, that a plain construction of Article 32 does not
justify this narrow view. The Article specifically sanctions the passing of directions
or orders independent of the mentioned writs. There is powerful support for the
proposition that under Article 32(2), the Court may issue any direction or orders
whatsoever, provided, that they are "appropriate" for the enforcement of rights.
The manner in which this position was indubitably established by the Court may
be seen through a series of cases, which document the shift from an initially hesitant
approach, to an assertive, rights-oriented one.

B. Judicial Trends
(i)

The Diffident Initial Pronouncements

The first case in which the Supreme Court confronted the compensation
quandary was Khatri v. State of Bihar.36 The petitioners in the case had been
blinded in police custody and demanded compensation for violation of their right
to life under Article 21. Bhagwati, J. observed that the Court ought to be prepared
to forge new tools and devise new remedies for vindicating the fundamental right
to life and personal liberty.37 Without expounding the law on the point, however,
the Court ordered the government to meet the expenses of housing these men in
a blind home in Delhi, as an interim measure.

3

3

3
36
37

THE OxRoRn ENousH DicrioNARY 295 (Catherine Soanes ed., 2003).
See generally V.N. Sauma, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 278-84 (M.P.

Singh ed., 2001).

See generally M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CoNSrrUTIoNAL LAW 1123 (2003),
A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 928.
Id. at 930. A disturbing contention of the State was that, the errant officers had
acted without the authority of law, and the State was thus immune from liability.
The Court rightly rejected this argument, on reasoning similar to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Monroe's case, where it gave a broad definition to "under the
color of law."
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Similarly in Sant Bir v. State ofBihar,8 where a criminal lunatic was detained
unlawfully in prison for sixteen years after regaining sanity, Bhagwati, J. did not
rule out the possibility of compensation for State excesses. However, no final
decision was given on this point. In Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar,39 however,
Bhagwati, J. chose to remain silent on the issue of whether damages are permissible
for illegal detention.
Hence, it is evident that while the judiciary was cognizant of the need for
innovative and effective mechanisms for shielding life and liberty of individuals
from State atrocities, it was reluctant at this stage, to award damages for the
violation of fundamental rights.

(ii) Breakthrough Decisions: Ambivalent Justifications
The breakthrough was achieved in Devaki Nanda v. State of Bihar.40 Here,
the petitioner's pension had been delayed for twelve years. Without much
discussion in the judgment, "exemplary costs" were awarded to the petitioner for
"intentional, deliberate and motivated" harassment of the petitioner, though no
specific rights violation was cited.
In the same year, the precedent-setting case of Rudul Soh v. State of Bihar,4'
was decided. Here the petitioner, who had been acquitted by the Court of Sessions,
but not released from prison for fourteen years, presented a habeas corpus
petition, wherein he also sought certain ancillary remedies like rehabilitation,
reimbursement of expenses for medical treatment, and compensation for illegal
incarceration. Since the petitioner was released before the actual hearing of the
petition, the mere issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would have been futile.
Under the conventional approach, the only remedy would have been to file a suit
to recover damages from the Government, but the difficulties of filing such a suit
were immense. The Court felt that if it refused to pass an order for compensation,

38

3
40
41

AI.R. 1982 S.C. 1470.
(1982) 2 S.C.C. 583.
A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1134.

A.I.R. 1983 S.C. io86.While this case is often celebrated as the one wherein
compensation was awarded for the first time in India for government lawlessness, it
was actually the famous JallianwalaBagh case in 1919, in which the Hunter
Commission held that the shooting was unjustified and, in an unprecedented move,
awarded Rs. 2000 each to the relatives of those who were killed. See P. Srikrishna
Rao, Custodial Deaths in India, (1994) 6 N.L.S.J. 42, 56.
102

Compensatory Jurisprudence
it would be doing only lip service to the fundamental right to liberty,42 and
accordingly ordered the Government to pay the petitioner a sum of Rs. 3o,000.
A two-track approach is discernible in this case. 43 While on the one hand
the Court wished to afford some "'palliative"in the form of a right to compensation,
simultaneously it desired to penalize for their unlawful acts "those
instrumentalities which act in the name of the public interest." The exact
jurisprudential basis for the award of monetary relief was therefore not clarified.
The path-breaking pronouncement in Rudul Sah was greeted with both
bouquets and brickbats. The judgment was welcomed as the Court had rightly
tried to punish an inert and callous executive, and tried to enforce conformity
with constitutional prescriptions. However, the irresolute nature of the judgment
was apparent. The rationale for awarding "damages" in Rudul as opposed to
"exemplary costs" in Devaki was not explained, and the Court had explicitly termed
the award a mere "palliative", though the author feels that the tone and tenor of
the judgment, culminating in the award of monetary relief, seemed to be building
up a case for the grant of "compensation." Further, the Court was not prepared to
hold that Article 32 per se allows for compensation in all cases of fundamental
rights violations4 Chadrachud, C.J. made a further qualification. He observed
that if the case had involved disputed questions of fact, then the Court would have
been constrained to direct the petitioner to approach the civil court.46 Rudul Sah
was indeed a commendable though ambivalent beginning, and in several
subsequent cases, its ratio was affirmed and expanded by the Court.
The jurisprudential ambivalence of the Court was again apparent in
Sebastian Hongray v. Union of India,4 where a writ of habeas corpus was issued

Id. at 1089.

42

3

This has to be seen in the context of the judicial activism that gripped the judiciary
in the mid-seventies. The Supreme Court, which had generally been a conservative,
tradition-bound institution, became sensitive to the needs of the weaker sections.
See further N. Santosh Hegde, Public Interest Litigation and the Control of the
Government, (1992) 4 STUD. Anv. 1.

44

Rudul Sah, supra note 41, at 1089.

45

As a response to this ruling, various eminent lawyers further raised the pertinent

contention that Article 32 itself was also not bereft of difficulties. The Court, under
Article 32, had to resolve disputed questions of fact before awarding damages, and
this would change the complexion of writ jurisdiction. See P.R Tripathi et al., Article
32 and the Compensation Conundrum, (1984) 2 S.C.C. (J) 51, 53.
46 Rudul Sah, supra note 41, at 1089.
4A.I.R.

1984 S.C. 1026.
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for the release of two men in army custody, but never executed. The Court ordered
the payment of "exemplary costs"48 to their wives (as the men were dead by that
time). The Court was obviously still not completely at ease with the budding
remedy of compensation, since it used the term "exemplary costs", when in fact it
appeared that the payment was awarded in view of the torture, agony and mental
oppression which the wives of the deceased had to undergo, and was more akin to
the concept of "damages" or "compensation." Hence the jurisprudential basis for
the award of the "damages" was still unclear.

(iii) Further Developments
In Bhim Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir,49 the Supreme Court finally averred
that it had "the right to award monetary compensation by way of exemplary costs
or otherwise."50 In this case, which involved a writ of habeas corpus, the Court
followed Rudul Sah and Sebastian, and directed the State to pay compensation.
Further, deviating from the rule that habeas corpus is remedial and not punitive,
it stated that in appropriate cases, where merely setting free the victim would not
wash away the mischief perpetrated, it may compensate the victim by awarding
suitable monetary compensation.
The trend of awarding compensation was well-settled by this time. In many
subsequent cases compensation was awarded to victims of State excesses, which
encroached on their fundamental rights.5' Of particular importance were cases,
which involved atrocities committed by the police. The Court took a strong view
of such excesses, and this helped in further elucidating the concept of monetary
compensation for fundamental rights violations by the State.

(iv) Custodial Deaths and Torture: Ambivalence Eschewed
The remedy of compensation for violation of fundamental rights takes on
special significance in cases of custodial deaths and torture. Although there is no
specific prohibition of torture and provision for compensation for its victims in
the Constitution, such rights have been read into the jurisprudence surrounding

Id. at 1028.
4
(1985) 4 S.C.C. 677.
W Id. at 686.
5' See, e.g., People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 355;
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1o86.
4
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Article 21. Besides, cases of torture and custodial deaths, by their very nature,
are likely to involve situations where a writ may not be a sufficient remedy, since
the damage would probably have occurred already. Further, such damage would
constitute incontrovertible and exfacie glaring infringement of fundamental rights.
The reasons for the award of compensation for the violation of fundamental
rights were expounded in Saheli v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi,53 where the
Court held that an action for damages lies for bodily harm, including battery,
assault, false imprisonment, physical injuries and death, since damages
represented a solatium for mental pain, distress, indignity, loss of liberty and
death54
The jurisprudential reasoning behind the award of damages in cases of
violations of fundamental rights was elucidated in Nilabati Behera v. State of
Orissa,55 which can truly be considered a landmark case in the development of law
in this area. The Supreme Court in this case eschewed all hesitation and laid down
in lucid terms that Article 32 imposed an obligation on the Court "to forge such
new tools as may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing
fundamental rights." Verma, J. enunciated that compensation under Articles 32
or 226 is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for the
contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity
does not apply, "even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an
action in tort."56
The Court held that this was the correct interpretation of Rudul Sah, and
was the basis of subsequent decisions as well. A hitherto ignored, but extremely
pertinent aspect was also touched upon in this case. The Court referred to Article
9(5)5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

Furqan Ahmad, CompensationforArbitraryArrest and CustodialDeath: A Basic Human
Right (2003) 12 Coco. UNW. L. REv. 41, 49.
* A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 513.
54 Id. at 516.
56 Supra note 3.
56 Supra note 3, at 1969. This reasoning was forcefully reiterated in P.U.C.L. v. Union
of India, AI.R. 1997 S.C. 1203, 1204-05. See also ConsumerEducation and Research
Centre v. Union of India, A..R. 1995 S.C. 922, 941, where the Court held that there
52

was no question of this defence being available against a constitutional remedy,
which was a practical and inexpensive mode for redressal of contravention of rights.
5 Article 9(5), I.C.C.P.R. provides:
[A]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall

have an enforceable right to compensation.
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("I.C.C.P.R."), to buttress its stance that award of compensation is not alien to the
concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right. Reference to the said Article 9(5)
was again made by the Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Basu v. Union ofIndia,0
wherein it was held that the Government of India's reservation to the I.C.C.P.R.,
on the ground that the India legal system does not recognize a right to
compensation, had lost its relevance in view of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court.
In D.K. Basu, the Supreme Court also reiterated that pecuniary
compensation was an appropriate, effective, and sometimes, the only suitable
remedy for redressal for rights violations, and, thus, leaving the aggrieved at the
mercy of remedies available in civil law, would hamper the Court's role as the
protector and custodian of the citizens' indefeasible rights to an unacceptable
degree.59

(v) Fencing the Power
Though the remedy of monetary compensation for violation of fundamental
rights is now well established, courts have at the same time imposed limitations
on their own power to grant such relief. For example, the courts may refuse to
issue a writ granting compensation, when disputed questions of facts arise, and
the tortious liability is clearly denied by the State.& In S.P.S. Rathore v. State of
Haryana,'6 the Supreme Court accepted the contention that it could grant
compensation only when there is a prima facie or established violation of a
guaranteed fundamental right When the foundational fact itself is in dispute, the
Court will desist from ordering compensation The exercise of the power under

Articles 32 or 226 for conducting an enquiry to determine compensation in glaring
and clear cases of custodial rape or death or, illegal detention of the poor and
helpless, is not feasible in such a case.

It is pertinent to note that the Government of India at the time of the ratification of
I.C.C.P.R., in 1979, had made a specific reservation to the effect that the

Indian legal system does not recognise a right to compensation for victims of
unlawful arrest or detention. See generally http://www.jnu.ac.in/Huriter/
AsiaHumanRights/1.doc (last visited March io, 2oo6).
58 A.LR. 1997 S.C. 61o, 624.
Id. at 618.
6o Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Sumathi, A.LR. 2000 S.C. 1603. See also Chairman,
Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v. Sukamani Das, A.I.R. i999 S.C. 3412.
6' J.T. 2005 (5) S.C. 257.
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M.C. Mehta v. Union of India" saw the Supreme Court take on another selfimposed restriction. It asserted its power to award compensation for violation of

fundamental rights, but limited this remedy to "appropriate cases", where the
infringement was gross and patent, that is, incontrovertible and exfacie glaring.
This would be the case where such infringement either affects the rights of many
persons, or appears unjiust, unduly harsh or oppressive, on account of the
disability of the victims to initiate or pursue action in civil courts. Put simply, the
infringement's magnitude must be such as to shock "the conscience of the Court."6 3
From the discussion in the above part, it is seen that though the concept of
granting compensation for violation of fundamental rights had an ambivalent
entry into Indian constitutional jurisprudence, it is now a well entrenched concept.
It is recognized that courts can and do award writ compensation for fundamental
rights violations. Further, when a court awards damages for infraction of Article
21, "it is administering the law of constitutional torts and it is for this reason that
it does not have to be inhibited by concepts peculiar to common law torts."6

V.

WELL BEGUN, BUT HALF-DONE: PROTRACTED
INCONSISTENCIES IN WRIT COMPENSATION JURISPRUDENCE
In India the parameters of State liability for its servants' tortious acts are
not defined by legislation. Hence, the Supreme Court has invoked the principles
of human rights jurisprudence to compensate the victims of "governmental
lawlessness." However, the application of these principles has not conformed to
any clearly discernible pattern. Thus, there are a number of lingering qualms in
this sphere.

a. Quantum of Compensation: In most cases, courts have not specified any
basis for calculating compensation.5 There is thus no uniformity or continuity in
the amounts awarded. The Court came closest to laying down some principles, in
Nilabati Behera. Factors such as the age of the deceased and his current and
potential earning capacity were taken into account in assessing the amount of

62

6
6

Supra note 51.
Supra note 51, at 1og.
PATEL, supra note 5, at 244. The judiciary itself seems to be inching towards adopting

the nomenclature of "Constitutional Torts", as can be seen from various High Court
decisions. See, e.g., Gopal Krishna v. Union of India, 2001 (3) A.L.D. 436.
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See generally Anupa V. Thapliyal, Compensation in Writ Jurisdiction:A Few Basic
Questions, (1998) 25(4) IND. BAR REv. 95.
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compensation. However, the calculation was made on a fact specific basis, and its
application to all situations, may not be feasible. There is, therefore, an acute
need for guidelines and rules for the award of compensation, which has so far
been left to the judges' absolute discretion, subjecting victims to "the fluctuating
fortunes of justice."" The author accepts that the quantum of compensation must
necessarily differ, depending upon the gravity and surrounding circumstances of
the rights violation, the possibility of mala fides on the part of the concerned
official, the extent of the disregard shown towards the possible infringement of
the right, the loss of life or limb, the number and condition of any dependants of
the victim, her/his earning capacity, and the need to send out a clear signal to the
administration, that callousness towards citizens' rights will not be countenanced.
However, as far as is possible, judicial decisions on this point must be backed by
consistent reasoning.

b. Determining "Appropriate Cases" for Awarding Compensation: In Rudul
Sah, the Supreme Court held that writ compensation will be awarded only in
"cases of gross violation." Subsequently, in the M.C. Mehta, the Court imposed a
restriction on itself, declaring that a rights violation, which was serious enough to
shock the Court's conscience, was a mandatory pre-requisite.67 However, a perusal
of the different decisions reveals that the courts have not followed this self imposed
restriction.P Concerned with this trend, the Supreme Court, in the recent case of
A.K. Singh v. UttarakhandJan Morcha'69 had to strike down the exorbitant
compensation awarded by the Allahabad High Court, and felt that the "doctrine of
Constitutional Tort" had been misused. In certain cases, courts have awarded
compensation as an interim measure, and have left the remedy to approach the
civil court to claim damages open to the aggrieved persons. However, there is no
judicial decision on when such interim compensation should be granted. There is
need to clarify the position of the law, and to prevent its inconsistent and arbitrary
application. The author feels that the Courts must elucidate an unambiguous,
comprehensible approach, so that some victims are not unjustly deprived of the
benefits of compensation.

66

Jacob P. Alex, ConstitutionalTort: Need for a Novel Outlook, A.I.R.

2001

(JOUR.) 207,

212.
67

68
69

Further, in R.N. Ghoshal v. University of Calcutta, (2002) 7 S.C.A.L.E. 137, 141, the
Court said that it would not award damages against public authorities, merely
because of an ultra vires order or inaction in discharge of duty, unless there is malice
or conscious abuse.
See P.B. Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West Bengal, A..R. 1996 S.C. 2426.
(1999) 4 S.C.C. 476.
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c. Personal versus State Liability: In the U.S., the widely accepted view is
that State liability is the natural choice, as opposed to personal liability, since it
ensures effective compensation for the plaintiff.70 Further, avoidance of overdeterring conscientious officers from taking decisions that are in the public
interest, is also a factor. Large amounts of discretion are vested in administrative
officers, and they cannot perform their functions if their hands are constrained
by invisible chainsa'
There is, however, no such steadfast rule in India. In Rudul Sah and Saheli,
the Court opined that the State might proceed against the deviant officer.72 In
certain other cases, the court has directly held the deviant officer personally
liable.n It is further generally accepted that when the court awards compensation,
it is ultimately the taxpayer's money which is being expended to make up for
inaction or wrongful action, on the part of government officials, and in such cases,
though immediate payment should be made from the public funds, the same should
be recovered from the errant officer.74 However, State liability, rather than
personal liability, is the usual practice. A plethora of cases show that, even where
the officer's action is seriously in doubt, the State is held liable7
The author feels that the "deep pockets" of the State, and the more equitable
spreading of losses over a multitude of taxpayers, who enjoy governmental
services and should therefore also bear responsibility for government-induced
harm, makes it appropriate to impose liability on the State, except in cases where
70
71
72

72

Jefferson, supra note 13, at 1555-56.
Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts, supra note 4, at 48-50.
See Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, supra note 51, at 1089; Saheli v. Commissioner of
Police, supra note 53, at 516.
In Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1483, the erring officer was
asked to deposit Rs. 6o lakhs in the Court. In Smt. Susheelamma v. State of Karnataka,
1991 Cal. L.J. 2436, the High Court was convinced that the petitioner's husband
and nephew had been illegally detained, without even a formal complaint or
registration of a case against them. The Court felt that the detenue-victims were
deprived of Article 21 protection. Hence the concerned officer, was directed to pay
Rs. 2500/- personally to the detenues.

7

7s

See generally Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K Gupta, (1994) 1 S.C.C. 243,
264.
In R.S. Sodhi v. State of U.P., (1991) 2 S.C.C. 463, officials pulled out ten young Sikhs
from a bus carrying Sikh pilgrims, took them to an adjoining jungle and shot them
dead. However, the State was made liable for the compensation awarded to the
petitioners. There have been several such cases, especially of army and custodial
violence, where gross irregularities on the individual officers' part went unpunished,
and the State was made to pay the compensation. See Bacha Bora v. State of Assam,
1991 CRI. L.J. 2782; Smt Purnima Barua v. Union of India, 1991 Cru. L.J. 2675.
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the officer's wrongdoing is gross and patent, that is, incontrovertible and ex facie
glaring.

d. Strict-Liability Norm in Writ Compensation: The strict liability norm"I
has been criticized as overtly harsh, since the bulk of powers in the hands of
administrative officers are discretionary in naturel If every action is weighed
and measured by this precarious doctrine, the flexible nature of the powers would
become futile. However, it is pertinent to note that the courts themselves have
not strictly adhered to this norm, and in the majority of cases, the respondents
are given ample opportunity to defend their action. This is the position in other
jurisdictions as well, including the U.S.A."

VI.

CONCLUSION

What is truly striking about India is the lack of respect for the rule of
law, not just among the people, but also among those who make and
those who enforce them.8o
Torts committed by State employees, resulting in rights violations, would
be actionable wrongs for which a remedy would lie in a civil court for damages.
However, the Supreme Court, perhaps taking a cue from judicial trends in
contemporaneous liberal democracies, has been prepared to forge innovative
and expedient devices for vindicating the fundamental rights, by interpreting the
constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226, to include the grant of monetary
compensation, which is an apposite, effective, and perhaps, the only suitable
remedy for redressal of the established infringement of fundamental rights.
Jurists have assailed this novel public law remedy by questioning the
competence of the court to award "Writ Compensation." As we have seen, the
authority to evolve this mode of Constitutional reparation may be derived directly

6
77

78

Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, supra note 3, at 1969.
Vandana Pai and T. Karthik Kumar, Writ Compensation: Issues and Perspectives,
(2001) 13 STun. Av. 195,, at 202.
Even in Rudul Sah v. State of Bikar, supra note 41, the Courts awarded compensation
only after completely satisfying themselves that the authorities blatantly exceeded
their power and acted with utter disregard for the law.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, supra
note 25.
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from the language and purpose of Article 32 itself." Further, the court will be
unable to effectively fulfill its role of protector and guarantor of the citizens'
indefeasible rights, if it leaves those aggrieved of fundamental rights infringements,
to seek civil remedies.
The American experience demonstrates that the significant benefits to the
policy goals of public tort law - improved compensation to victims, enhanced
deterrence, renewed vigour in decision making, and the increased integrity of the
legal order itself - outweigh any potential negative results from these proposals
for liability.
However, the judiciary in its well-intentioned zeal to alleviate public wrongs
through an approach analogous to Constitutional Tort, is now finding itself bereft
of guidance in determining issues of compensation for fundamental rights
violations. Given the glaring anomalies in compensatory jurisprudence, the author
submits that there is a need for legislation for fixing the parameters of the State
liability, and for a novel reorientation of the doctrine of "Constitutional Tort."

0'

See Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R 1984 S.C. 802.
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